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1 Introduction
There is a successful literature showing that networks among individuals or organisations af-
fect several outcomes of economic interest, such as academic achievement (Sacerdote, 2001),
job search (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004), smoking decisions (Nakajima, 2007), criminal
actions (Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2004), technology adoption (Conley and Udry, 2010), exec-
utives’ compensation (Gayle, Golan, and Miller, 2015), and firms’ performance (Cai and Szeidl,
2018). This recognition has fuelled a growing attention for estimating models in which agents
purposefully create links according to a payoff configuration, an equilibrium notion, and an in-
formation structure (network formation models). Indeed, backing out agents’ preferences for
links is crucial because agents’ link choices often change simultaneously with agents’ behaviours
on networks in response to policy interventions (Graham, 2015; de Paula, 2017).
Our paper considers a static game of network formation featuring complete information,
nonreciprocal links,1 and a relatively small number of players.2 The payoff that player i gets
from linking to player j is allowed to depend on the number of other players linking to j.
Economic theory suggests that this spillover effect has a key role in many applications inspired
by the corporate governance and industrial organisation literatures, e.g., board interlocks among
competing firms (Thompson and McEwen, 1958; Allen, 1974; Mizruchi, 1996), hyperlinks among
news websites (Dellarocas, Katona, and Rand, 2013), advice-seeking ties (Lazega, Lemercier,
and Mounier, 2006; Lazega, et al., 2012; Lazega and Snijders, 2015), and trading connections
(Kranton and Minehart, 2000a; 2000b; 2001).
The spillover effect considered implies that the network formation game admits multiple
equilibria. Along the lines of the literature on entry games with multiple equilibria (Tamer, 2003;
Galichon and Henry 2006; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009; Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari,
2011; Galichon and Henry, 2011; de Paula, 2013; Aradillas-Lopez and Rosen, 2016; Bontemps
and Kumar, 2018), we provide partial identification arguments for the payoff parameters, under
the assumption that the researcher has data on many equilibrium networks.
The methodological challenge faced is that econometric results from the literature on entry
games with multiple equilibria cannot be directly applied to our setting. This is because they
would lead to a characterisation of the sharp identified set based on a prohibitively enormous
amount of moment inequalities, even with just 3 players. We overcome such an issue by lever-
aging on the structure assigned to the players’ preferences. In particular, the spillover effect
considered permits us to decompose the network formation game into some local games3 such
that the network formation game is in equilibrium if and only if each local game is in equi-
librium. The if and only if relation between the network formation game and the local games
(hereafter, if and only if property) reveals that the set of equilibria of the network formation game
is the Cartesian product of the set of equilibria of the local games, which thereby substantially
decreases the curse of dimensionality in the analysis.
A principle analogous to the if and only if property is found in the study of single agent
models when preferences are assumed separable in order to make difficult economic problems
1I.e., the existence of a link from agent i to agent j does not imply the existence of a link from j to i.
2In practice, simulations suggest that our methodology works well for networks with up to 20 players.
3A local game of the network formation game is a game whose sets of players and strategy profiles are subsets
of the network formation game’s sets of players and strategy profiles.
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more manageable. In some sense, the if and only if property provides a reinterpretation of the
separability notion in a context with interacting agents.
The if and only if property solves several problems hampering our ability to estimate the
payoff parameters. First, it helps us prove the existence of an equilibrium of the network
formation game, by building on results from Berry (1992). Second, it reduces the number of
moment inequalities characterising the sharp identified set, by restricting the attention to the
local games under some restrictions on the taste shocks and equilibrium selection. Third, it
simplifies the calculation of the integrals which enter the moment inequalities, by showing that
their value depend on the equilibria of the local games only. As a result, inference on the sharp
identified set is computationally workable for sufficiently small networks. When networks are not
sufficiently small, we also recommend an outer set of parameter values which seems to induce an
almost unnoticeable loss of information with respect to the sharp identified set in simulations.
An illustration about inter-organisational ties demonstrates how the developed procedure
works in practice. Most organisations are governed by a board of directors composed of execu-
tives and non-executives. The former lead the decision making process, the latter are involved
in the supervision and guidance of the executives. In many European countries, firms often
have some of their executives sitting on competitors’ boards with or without executive duties.
These links among companies are denominated primary horizontal board interlocks (hereafter,
PHBIs).4 Deeply analysed by finance experts, PHBIs also draw the attention of economists
because they might help firms transmit tacit knowledge, increase transparency, or encourage
collusion, with a consequent impact on market structures. In this respect, the literature em-
phasises that firms could behave strategically when deciding whether to allow their executives
to join rivals’ boards. In particular, firms may prefer companies targeted also by other com-
petitors, in order to promote meetings with as many industry actors as possible and, in turn,
facilitate information flow (Thompson and McEwen, 1958; Allen, 1974; Mizruchi, 1996). Hence,
firm i’s payoff from having an executive sitting on rival j’s board is expected to be increasing
in the number of other competitors participating in j’s board assemblies. Using the techniques
discussed above, we are able to empirically test such a prediction. Specifically, we construct
a 95% confidence region for the set of parameter values characterised in the first part of the
paper using Italian data. Our results reveal that the spillover effect of interest has a positive
sign, thus confirming that the creation of PHBIs is motivated by information sharing purposes.
Lastly, via a counterfactual analysis, we use the estimated preferences to analyse the impact
on networks and companies’ payoffs of various policies restricting the formation of PHBIs, e.g.,
the enforcement of a law which prevents the biggest firms within each industry from creating
PHBIs.
This paper borrows from two strands of the literature to provide a novel framework for
studying identification in a network formation game. More precisely, in addition to the entry
game literature cited earlier, this paper is connected to the literature on the econometrics of net-
work formation models (Currarini, Jackson, and Pin, 2009; Christakis, et al., 2010; Goldsmith-
Pinkham and Imbens, 2013; Leung, 2015; Boucher, 2017; Hsieh and Lee, 2016; Menzel, 2016;
4The adjective “horizontal” denotes the fact that firms are competitors (Carrington, 1981). The adjective
“primary” denotes the fact that firms share directors with executive roles (Stokman, Van Der Knoop, and Wasseur,
1988).
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Miyauchi, 2016; Sheng, 2016; Badev, 2017; Mele, 2017; Ridder and Sheng, 2017; de Paula,
Richards-Shubik, and Tamer, 2018; Leung, 2019). Miyauchi (2016) and Sheng (2016) are the
most similar studies. Both works focus on reciprocal links5 and can handle a large number
of players. The region of parameters values they characterise are neither shown to be sharp
nor studied in relation to the sharp identified set. The spillover effects in Miyauchi (2016) are
required to have a positive sign. The spillover effects in Sheng (2016) are assumed positive for
some model specifications. Our methodology aims to be complementary to both papers. Indeed,
it may be preferred by users who are interested in the spillover effect we analyse and work with
small networks featuring nonreciprocal links. This is because our approach permits researchers
to possibly exhaust all the implications of the model and data, and to test theoretical predictions
on the sign of the spillover effect without restricting such a sign a priori.
This paper is also connected to the literature on inter-organisational ties, e.g., board in-
terlocks, cross-ownerships, joint ventures, and supply and distribution channels. In particular,
according to the inter-organizational linkage theories, companies are entities that possess inter-
ests. In pursuit of these interests, they form relations with other firms. For example, they share
board members as an attempt to transfer information and, consequently, decrease investment
uncertainty, anticipate disturbances, promote coordination, or convey expertise (Thompson and
McEwen, 1958; Dooley, 1969; Allen, 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Aldrich, 1979), especially
when this happens with competitors (Carrington, 1981; Leslie, 2004; Gabrielsen, Hjelmeng, and
Sørgard, 2011; Waller, 2011)6 and through the exchange of executives (Mintz and Schwartz,
1981; Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi and Bunting, 1981; Stokman, Wasseur, and Elsas, 1985; Stok-
man, Van Der Knoop, and Wasseur, 1988; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994). Most of the empirical
findings on board interlocks focus on the correlation between a firm’s profitability or size, and
the intensity of board interlocks (Dooley, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; Allen, 1974; Bunting, 1976; Pen-
nings, 1980; Carrington, 1981; Burt, 1983; Meeusen and Cuyvers, 1985; Mizruchi and Stearns,
1988; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Booth and Deli, 1996). Some empirical works analyse the im-
pact of board interlocks (exogenously taken or instrumented) on firms’ internal decisions, e.g.,
executives’ compensations (Hallock, 1997; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Patnam, 2013;
Gayle, Golan, and Miller, 2015), patenting and R&D spending (Helmers, Patnam, and Rau,
2015), and hiring choices (Lalanne, 2018). Our empirical illustration aims to shed further light
on the role of board interlocks, by estimating, for the first time, a model in which firms’ decisions
about PHBIs are interdependent due to information sharing incentives.
In what follows, Section 2 illustrates the model, Section 3 develops identification arguments,
Section 4 describes the empirical illustration, and Section 5 provides conclusions. Additional
details are in the supplementary material. In terms of notation, bold case letters denote matrices,
non-bold case letters denote vectors and scalars. Given the finite set R, |R| stands for R’s
cardinality and KR indicates the collection of R’s non-empty subsets. Given A⊆ R, R \ A is
the complement of A in R. Lastly, given N≡ {1, ..., N}, N2 denotes the set of all the ordered
pairs of different elements from N.
5I.e., the existence of a link from agent i to agent j implies the existence of a link from j to i.
6Also some policy reports, e.g., OECD (2008; 2010), discuss information exchanges between competitors
through board interlocks.
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2 A network formation game
There are N ∈ N \ {1, 2} players, labelled by the integers in N ≡ {1, ..., N}, simultaneously
deciding who to link with, under complete information. The players choose links in order to
maximise payoffs which depend on the realised links and the players’ characteristics.
We focus on frameworks featuring relatively small N . This is typical in applications inspired
by the corporate governance or industrial organisation literature, as they are usually charac-
terised by few key actors. For example, the empirical illustration in Section 4 has N ≤ 15.
We consider nonreciprocal links, such as PHBIs, trading connections, advice-seeking ties, and
hyperlinks among websites.7
The output of the game is represented by an N ×N matrix, G, with the ij-th component,
Gij , equal to 1 if the link from player i to player j (hereafter, link ij) is formed and 0 otherwise.
G is possibly asymmetric to embed non-reciprocity of relationships, i.e., Gij can be different
from Gji for any (i, j) ∈N2. There are no self-links, i.e., Gii = 0 ∀i ∈N. G is often referred to
as a directed network. The players are also denominated the nodes of the network. Links from
player i to the other players are i’s outgoing links. Links from the other players to player i are
i’s incoming links.
For simplicity of exposition and without loss of generality, we present the methodological part
of the paper by focusing on settings where the formation of the link ij requires the consent of
player i only (hereafter, unilateral case). Examples are individuals nominating who they would
ask for advice on technology adoption and hyperlinks among websites. Appendix B explains how
all the results can be replicated in settings where the consent of both players i and j is necessary
for forming the link ij (hereafter, bilateral case), further differentiating between transferable and
non-transferable payoffs. Examples are PHBIs, trading connections, and consulting ties.
More formally, in the unilateral case the players decide on forming outgoing links. For
each player i ∈ N, a pure strategy vector is Gi· ≡ (Gij ∀j ∈ N \ {i}) ∈ {0, 1}N−1. A pure
strategy profile of the game is G ∈ G ≡ {0, 1}N(N−1). Each player i ∈ N is endowed with
some characteristics, (Xi, i), assigned beforehand by nature. Xi ∈ X ⊆ RK is observed by
the researcher. i ≡ (ij ∀j ∈ N \ {i}) ∈ RN−1 is unobserved by the researcher, where ij
represents player i’s taste shock for the link ij. X ≡ (Xi ∀i ∈ N) and  ≡ (i ∀i ∈ N) are
common knowledge to all the players. The payoff that player i gets from participating in the
game depends on (G,X, ) and is denoted by ui(G,X, ; θu), where θu ∈ Θu ⊂ Rdu is a vector
of parameters. The agents play pure strategy Nash equilibrium (hereafter, PSNE).8 G ∈ G is a
PSNE if it is robust to multi-link deviations by each player.
Definition 1. (PSNE of the network formation game) G ∈ G is a PSNE of the network forma-
tion game if
Ui(Gi·,G−{i·},X, ; θu) ≥ Ui(G˜i·,G−{i·},X, ; θu),
7Firm i having an executive sitting on company j’s board does not imply j having an executive sitting on i’s
board. Agent i buying from agent j does not imply j buying from i. Agent i consulting agent j does not imply
j consulting i. Website i containing an hyperlink to website j does not imply j containing an hyperlink to i.
8As in Mele (2017), we use PSNE for the unilateral case. Instead, when analysing the bilateral case in
Appendix B, we impose pairwise stability, which is more appropriate for situations where the formation of the
link ij requires the consent of both players i and j. See, e.g., Bloch and Jackson (2006) for a discussion of various
equilibrium notions in network formation games.
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∀G˜i· ∈ {0, 1}N−1 \ {Gi·} and ∀i ∈ N, where G−{i·} denotes the network G without the vector
Gi·. 
3 Identification
We assume that the researcher observes the equilibrium network, G, and the players’ charac-
teristics, X, for many replications of the game (many-network setting).9 This section examines
how to identify θu using those data.
3.1 Assumptions on payoffs
In Section 2 player i’s payoff is in principle allowed to depend on the link decisions of all the
other players. For example, the payoff that player i gets from linking to player j may depend
on i and j’s links, the links that i and j have in common, the connections of the players linked
with j, etc. In the network formation literature, such interdependences among the players’ link
decisions are referred to as spillover effects.
Spillover effects complicate the identification and estimation of θu for two reasons: first, they
may cause non-existence of an equilibrium and make the model incoherent; second, they may
generate multiple equilibria and make the model incomplete (Tamer, 2003). Multiple equilibria
usually lead to partially identified parameters. Inference on the sharp identified set involves
computing the sample analogues of an overwhelming amount of moment inequalities. Moreover,
obtaining those sample analogues requires calculating integrals which depend on the set of
equilibria of the network formation game. The integral calculation is done by simulation: we
draw many realisations of the preference shocks, we enumerate all the possible networks, and we
verify whether each candidate network is an equilibrium for every drawn realisation of the latent
variables. Overall, implementing such a procedure for the general network formation game of
Section 2 is computationally unworkable without further assumptions, even for N = 3.
To improve tractability, researchers typically restrict the types of spillover effects considered.
Our paper focuses on a specific spillover effect: the payoff that player i gets from forming the
link ij is allowed to depend on the number of other players linking to j. Economic theory
suggests that this spillover effect has a key role in many applications of interest. We provide
four examples inspired by the corporate governance and industrial organisation literatures.
PHBIs As anticipated in Section 1, when firms decide whether to allow their executives to
join rivals’ boards, they may prefer companies targeted also by other competitors, in order to
promote meetings with as many industry actors as possible and, in turn, facilitate information
flow (Thompson and McEwen, 1958; Allen, 1974; Mizruchi, 1996). Hence, firm i’s payoff from
having an executive sitting on rival j’s board is expected to depend on (and, specifically, be
increasing in) the number of other competitors participating in j’s board assemblies. More
details on this application are in Section 4.
9The researcher is assumed to observe all the realised links. We abstract from statistical issues like missing
data on the realised links or sampling data from the realised links, which are relevant instead in large network
models.
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Hyperlinks among news websites Hyperlinks are extensively used by news websites to
integrate their own content with more detailed information offered by a third party. An extreme
case is represented by the so-called “content aggregators”, such as Google News, Yahoo News,
or the Huffington Post, which produce little original material and mostly refer to other news
websites. Generally, the link source does not have to ask for permission or pay fees to the link
target. In a world where news websites compete with each other to attract and monetise traffic,
researchers want to learn about media’s incentives behind such a unilateral free linking practice,
in order to measure its impact on the production of high-quality content. In particular, on
one hand, the link source reduces the time visitors spend at its site (and so sustains losses) by
bringing them to the target. On the other hand, the link source gets revenues from the ability
to attract new visitors by permitting access to the target. However, these revenues may suffer
the rivalry of other news websites connecting to the same target (Dellarocas, Katona, and Rand,
2013). Therefore, news website i’s payoff from linking to news website j is expected to depend
on (and, specifically, be decreasing in) the number of other news websites linking to j.
Advice-seeking ties Judges, attorneys, or consultants dealing with competition litigations
typically face very heterogeneous cases whose resolution depends on the knowledge of the specific
industry in which the conflict occurs. For this reason, they use each other for advice intensively.
A careful analysis of the determinants of such advice-seeking ties is essential to explain the
evolution of competition case law in various economic sectors. In particular, the literature
emphasises that advice-seeking converges on recognised members of the community and that
recognition is endogenous: members sought out by many agents build a reputation because
selecting them is perceived as a safe source of legitimacy of expertise claims (Lazega, Lemercier,
and Mounier, 2006; Lazega, et al., 2012; Lazega and Snijders, 2015). Therefore, agent i’s payoff
from asking agent j for advice is expected to depend on (and, specifically, be increasing in) the
number of other agents nominating j as advisor.
Trading networks Trading networks consist of buyer-supplier ongoing contracts among firms
and are commonly used by companies to exchange goods. They are distinguished from anony-
mous markets because a buyer can obtain a good from a seller only if these two are linked.
Economists are interested in understanding whether the allocations generated by trading net-
works are efficient and aligned with social welfare. In particular, the literature points out that,
given the necessity of forming a link in order to enjoy commerce in the future, the structure
of ties may influence the competition for goods. This is because third parties could affect the
agreement terms in bilateral transactions by changing the value of outside options (Kranton
and Minehart, 2000a; 2000b; 2001). For example, consider a group of companies each offering a
different service, e.g., legal, accounting, consulting, marketing, etc. Suppose that every company
has to choose between internalising and buying from other firms in the group any service needed
for operational activities. In light of the previous remarks, we expect a buyer’s bargaining power
with a seller to depend on (and, specifically, be decreasing in) the number of other companies
buying from that seller.
Assumption 1 formalises the restrictions on the players’ payoffs illustrated above.
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Assumption 1. (Spillover effect)
a) ui(·; θu) is additively separable in player i’s outgoing links, i.e.,
ui(G,X, ; θu) ≡
∑
j∈N\{i}
Gij × uij(G−{i·},X, ; θu), (1)
where uij(·; θu) is the payoff that i gets from forming the link ij.
b) uij(·; θu) is additively separable in (X, ) and G−{i·}. Moreover, uij(·; θu) depends on G−{i·}
only through the number of player j’s incoming links and this dependence is monotonic.
Specifically,
uij(G−{i·},X, ; θu) ≡ zij(X, ;β) + vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}
Gkj ; δ), (2)




For example, the following utility specification satisfies Assumption 1 for N = 4:
ui(G,X, ; θu) ≡Gij × [β′|Xi −Xj |+ δ log(Ghj +Gkj + 1) + ij ]+
Gih × [β′|Xi −Xh|+ δ log(Gjh +Gkh + 1) + ih]+
Gik × [β′|Xi −Xk|+ δ log(Gjk +Ghk + 1) + ik].
We now provide an overview of the technical use of Assumption 1 in the paper. Assumption
1 a) implies that player i wants to create any link as long as its net return is positive. This
allows to represent a PSNE of the network formation game as the solution of a simultaneous
discrete choice model. By adding Assumption 1 b), one can partition the network formation
game into N local games such that the players’ payoffs within each local game are not affected
by the players’ choices outside of it. This is crucial to maintain that the network formation
game is in equilibrium if and only if each local game is in equilibrium (if and only if property
in Proposition 1). As carefully examined in the next sections, the if and only if property is
a powerful result because it helps us substantially mitigate the curse of dimensionality in the
analysis. Introducing additional spillover effects into ui(·; θu) causes the if and only if property
to fail and more restrictions are needed to achieve similar simplifications. Lastly, the assumption
about the monotonicity of vj(·; δj) is exploited, together with the if and only property, to show
equilibrium existence and to speed the calculation of the integrals which enter the identifying
moment inequalities.10
Remark 1 concludes by comparing Assumption 1 with restrictions imposed in other papers.
Remark 1. Let us analyse some (de)merits of Assumption 1 through a comparison with the
restrictions in Miyauchi (2016), Sheng (2016), de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer (2018)
(hereafter, PST), and Mele (2017).
As we do, Miyauchi and Sheng examine a many-network setting. Unlike here, they focus on
reciprocal links, i.e., Gij = Gji ∀(i, j) ∈ N2. Miyauchi and Sheng’s methodologies can handle
10Note that when vj(·; δj) is nonlinear, the network formation game may not be a potential game. Potential
games can help simplify the econometric analysis, as discussed in Sheng (2016) and Mele (2017).
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various spillover effects and are manageable for large N . However, the regions of parameters
values they characterise are neither proved to be sharp nor studied in relation to the sharp
identified set. Moreover, the spillover effects in Miyauchi are required to have a positive sign
and the spillover effects in Sheng are assumed positive for some model specifications. Instead,
we do not restrict the sign of δ.
PST and Mele examine a one-network setting. PST focus on reciprocal links and allow con-
nections up to distance D to affect utility. However, preferences in PST are such that the players
never choose more than L links in total, which, e.g., is not verified in the PHBIs’ application
of Section 4.11 Moreover, according to the PST’s framework, the players’ observed character-
istics are discrete and the players are endowed with a preference shock for each realisation of
those characteristics. Thus, potential friends of the same type are viewed as perfect substitutes.
Instead, we accommodate richer unobserved heterogeneity by including pair specific preference
shocks, which seems more appropriate when dealing with small groups of players. Mele consid-
ers nonreciprocal links and includes various spillover effects. However, Mele imposes equilibrium
uniqueness by designing a sequential meeting process, while instead we contemplate multiple
equilibria. 
3.2 Existence of an equilibrium
This section proves that the network formation game has at least one equilibrium for every
value of the payoff-relevant variables and parameters, by building on results from Berry (1992).
Arguments are made of intermediate results which are interesting per se because they highlight
aspects of the model playing a key role later in the identification analysis.
We first show that the inequalities in Definition 1 simplify to a system of N(N−1) equations
whose solution is an equilibrium of the network formation game.
Lemma 1. (Characterisation of a PSNE of the network formation game) Under Assumption 1
a), G ∈ G is a PSNE of the network formation game if and only if
Gij = 1{uij(G−{i·},X, ; θu) ≥ 0} ∀(i, j) ∈N2. (3)

We now introduce the local games. For each j ∈N, let the section j be the network portion
collecting all the nodes of the network and all the links pointing to node j. Figures 1 and 2 help
clarify the definition of the section j.
Let the section j game be the game underlying the formation of the section j, i.e., in the
section j game the players other than player j simultaneously decide whether to link to j. A
pure strategy for each player i ∈N\ {j} is Gij ∈ {0, 1} and a pure strategy profile of the game
is G·j ≡ (Gij ∀i ∈ N\ {j}) ∈ {0, 1}N−1. Under Assumption 1, each player i ∈ N\ {j} gets the
payoff Gij × [zij(X, ;β) + vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}Gkj ; δ)]. Agents play PSNE.
11Indeed, the Italian legal system does not impose limits on the number of board interlocks that a company
can form.
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Figure 1: Example of network with N = 5.
Figure 2: Section 1, section 2, ..., section 5 of the network in Figure 1.
Definition 2. (PSNE of the section j game) Under Assumption 1, G·j ∈ {0, 1}N−1 is a PSNE
of the section j game if
Gij = 1{zij(X, ;β) + vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}
Gkj ; δ) ≥ 0} ∀i ∈N\ {j}. (4)

Note thatG ∈ Gcan be written as (G·1, ..., G·N ), whereG·1 ∈ {0, 1}N−1,..., G·N ∈ {0, 1}N−1.
Moreover, under Assumption 1, the players’ payoffs within the section j game depend on G
exclusively via G·j , i.e., they are not affected by the players’ choices outside the section j
game.12 The if and only if property follows.
Proposition 1. (If and only if property) Under Assumption 1, G ≡ (G·1, G·2, ..., G·N ) ∈ G is a
PSNE of the network formation game if and only if G·j ∈ {0, 1}N−1 is a PSNE of the section j
game ∀j ∈N. 
Proposition 1 characterises the set of equilibria of the network formation game as the Carte-
sian product of the set of equilibria of the section 1 game,..., section N game. Its usefulness goes
beyond the existence arguments discussed here. Indeed, Proposition 1 is exploited in Section 3.5
to reduce the number of moment inequalities defining the sharp identified set and to simplify
the calculation by simulation of the integrals entering those moment inequalities.13
Continuing with the existence proof, it can be noticed that the structure of the section j
game when vj(·; δ) is monotone decreasing (increasing) is similar to the structure of an entry
12Nevertheless, up to this point of the exposition, the outcome chosen by the players from the equilibrium set
of the section j game can be statistically correlated with the outcome chosen by the players from the equilibrium
set of the section h game through the equilibrium selection mechanism.
13Proposition 1 holds also under a weaker version of Assumption 1. More details are in Appendix A.
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game with substitution (complementary) effects.14 Existence of a PSNE of the section j game
when vj(·; δ) is monotone increasing is guaranteed by Tarski’s fixed point theorem. Existence of
a PSNE of the section j game when vj(·; δ) is monotone decreasing can be shown by adapting
to our model the constructive proof developed by Berry (1992) to prove equilibrium existence
in an entry game with substitution effects. Merging these results, the section j game has an
equilibrium ∀j ∈N.
Proposition 2. (Existence of a PSNE of the section j game) Under Assumption 1, there exists
a PSNE of the section j game ∀j ∈N. 
The way in which existence of a local equilibrium is verified helps us determine some features
of the set of equilibria of the section j game, which are used in Section 3.5 to simplify further
the calculation of the integrals entering the identifying moment inequalities. In particular, when
vj(·; δ) is monotone increasing, Tarski’s fixed point theorem ensures existence of the greatest
and least equilibria of the section j game. When vj(·; δ) is monotone decreasing, one can mimic
another result from Berry (1992) stating that in an entry game with substitution effects all the
equilibria are characterised by the same number of firms entering the market.
Corollary 1. (Characterising the set of PSNE of the section j game) Under Assumption 1,
when vj(·; δ) is monotone increasing, there exists the greatest and least PSNE of the section
j game, ∀j ∈ N. Under Assumption 1, when vj(·; δ) is monotone decreasing, all the PSNE
of the section j game are characterised by the same number, n∗j ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}, of players
connecting to player j, ∀j ∈N. 
Continuing with the existence proof, by combining Propositions 1 and 2, it can be claimed
that the network formation game has at least one equilibrium.
Corollary 2. (Existence of a PSNE of the network formation game) Under Assumption 1, there
exists a PSNE of the network formation game. 
Remark 2 concludes by comparing section 1,...,section N with other local network decompo-
sitions proposed in the literature.
Remark 2. Also Sheng (2016) and PST suggest to decompose networks into local parts to
mitigate the various challenges hampering estimation. However, they use local network decom-
positions different from our.
Sheng focuses on subnetworks. More precisely, take any subset of nodes, A ⊆ N. The
subnetwork A is the submatrix of G containing all the links connecting the nodes in A. For
example, consider the network in Figure 1 and let A ≡ {1, 4, 5}. Then, the subnetwork A is
graphically represented in Figure 3. Let the subnetwork A game be the game underlying the
formation of the subnetwork A. Sheng characterises an identified set by constructing moment
inequalities based on the equilibria of subnetwork games, for various subnetworks. On one
hand, such a strategy implies that the number of moment inequalities does not depend anymore
on N , but it depends only on the subnetworks’ sizes. Therefore, by selecting sufficiently small
subnetworks, the number of moment inequalities is kept limited. On the other hand, the players’
14Just replace player j with the entry market.
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Figure 3: Subnetwork {1, 4, 5} of the network in Figure 1.
strategy profiles are overlapping across subnetwork games. Thus, collections of subnetwork
games do not satisfy the if and only if property. The failure of the if and only if property has
two consequences. First, the characterised identified set is usually non-sharp and it is difficult
to provide sufficient conditions under which it is sharp. Second, the characterised identified
set typically involves moment inequalities containing integrals whose computation by simulation
still requires getting the set of equilibria of the entire game. This is because a local equilibrium
is acceptable only when compatible with a global equilibrium. As getting the set of equilibria of
the entire game can be computationally expensive, further assumptions (e.g., sign restrictions)
are proposed by Sheng in some scenarios to facilitate the analysis.
PST focus on network types. More precisely, take any player i ∈N. Player i’s network type
is the submatrix of G which contains all the links affecting i’s payoff. For example, consider the
network in Figure 1. Under Assumption 1, player 5’s network type is graphically represented in
Figure 4.
Figure 4: Player 5’s network type of the network in Figure 1 under Assumption 1.
There are two main differences between our local network decomposition and the one in PST.
First, similarly to what discussed above about Sheng, collections of games underlying the for-
mation of network types do not satisfy the if and only if property. Second, our local network
decomposition serves to simplify the moment inequalities arising in a many-network setting. In-
stead, PST use network types to construct a law of large numbers in a one-network setting. 
3.3 Assumptions on the data generating process
This section describes the data generating process (hereafter, DGP). From now on, capital letters
denote random variables and small case letters are used for their realisations.
Assumption 2. (DGP)
a) An integer N is drawn from N \ {1, 2}. N agents, endowed with characteristics collected in
(X, ), are drawn from the population and play the network formation game described in
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Section 2 with payoffs satisfying Assumption 1. An equilibrium network, G, arises. If the set
of equilibria is non-singleton, then the players coordinate on an outcome from the equilibrium
set according to a selection mechanism that is unobserved by the researcher.15
The procedure is repeatedM times, withM large. A sample of observations, {nm,xm, gm}Mm=1,
is collected. The sampling scheme is designed such that the population probability distribu-
tion of G conditional on (N,X) (hereafter, empirical probability distribution of the observ-
ables) is nonparametrically identified.16,17
b)  is continuously distributed on RN(N−1), independently of (N,X), with cdf denoted by
F (·; θ), where θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rd is a vector of parameters.18
c) Θ ≡ (Θu ∪Θ) 3 θ ≡ (θu, θ) is compact.
d) All the random variables, vectors, and matrices are defined on the same probability space,
(Ω,F,P).

Assumption 2 is standard in models featuring many-network asymptotics. In what follows,
we provide some comments about the role of the players’ labels. In particular, Assumption 2
allows for three alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, the players’ identities are the same
across the observed networks. In this case, the labels assigned to the players correspond to their
identities, i.e., player i in network m is the same as player i in network m′.
In the second scenario, the players’ identities vary across the observed networks. However,
the observed networks have the same size and the players have fixed roles. In this case, the labels
assigned to the players correspond to their roles, i.e., player i in network m has the same role as
player i in network m′. For example, suppose that the players are firms and that the researcher
can rank them unambiguously with respect to size within each network. Then, the probability
of observing a network containing a link from firm i to firm j is interpreted as the probability
of observing a network containing a link from the i-th biggest firm to the j-th biggest firm.
In the third scenario, the players’ identities vary across the observed networks and the players
have no roles. In this case, the labels are assigned arbitrarily to the players within each network.
For example, suppose that the players are firms and that the only feature observed by the
researcher is their profitability in brackets. Within each network, it is likely that there are
two or more firms featuring the same profitability in brackets. Therefore, the researcher cannot
unambiguously rank the firms within each network. Such arbitrariness of labelling does not affect
15Note that Section 3.2 shows that the set of equilibria is always non-empty.
16“All that is needed is for the law of large numbers to hold.” (Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009, p.1799), e.g., an
i.i.d. sampling scheme or a stationary and ergodic sampling scheme.
17Note that the number of players, nm, is allowed to vary across m = 1, ...,M .
18Note that all the results in Section 3 are valid also if we assume that  is continuously distributed on RN(N−1)
conditional on (N,X), with conditional cdf denoted by F (·|N,X; θ) and known up to θ. Moreover, in principle,
one could carry on the identification analysis even without assuming that the (conditional) cdf of  belongs to a
parametric family. However, in practice, constructing the resulting sharp identified set would be an intractable
exercise because it requires searching for an infinite dimensional function, i.e., an admissible (conditional) cdf of
, for each value of the payoff parameters. Some recent studies investigate this issue in the absence of multiple
equilibria (Torgovitsky, 2018) or in the presence of multiple equilibria (Chesher and Rosen, 2019). We believe
that extending similar results to our framework deserves a separate research project.
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identification, i.e., the identification arguments developed in the next sections hold for any label
assignment. However, when doing inference and replacing probabilities with sample analogues,
the researcher needs to ensure that the chosen label assignment does not affect estimates. One
way to achieve that is to add sufficient conditions such that the probability distribution of G
conditional on (N,X) is invariant under permutations of the labels, as suggested by Sheng
(2016). This amounts to impose joint exchangeability of networks (Kallenberg, 2005).19 The
empirical illustration in Section 4 falls in the third scenario and we rely on joint exchangeability
of networks when conducting inference, as explained in Appendix ?? of the supplementary
material.
3.4 From multiple equilibria to partial identification
The spillover effect described in Assumption 1 implies that the network formation game can
have multiple equilibria. This means that the values of the exogenous variables do not uniquely
pin down the values of the endogenous variables. Equivalently, there is no unique mapping from
the parameters and the exogenous variables to the endogenous variables.
As the equilibrium selection mechanism is unobserved by the researcher and economic the-
ory provides no clear guidance regarding its form, the econometric analysis proceeds by allowing
for multiple equilibria. Under multiple equilibria, deriving sufficient conditions for point iden-
tification of the parameters is difficult.20 Therefore, the study discusses partial identification
of the parameters, i.e., it admits the possibility that there may be more than one parameter
value able to generate the empirical probability distribution of the observables under the model’s
assumptions.
3.5 The sharp identified set
The sharp identified set, Θ?, is the set of parameter values for which one can find an equilibrium
selection mechanism that delivers the empirical joint probability distribution of the observables
when combined with the model’s assumptions. The definition of Θ? does not facilitate inference
because it involves the equilibrium selection mechanism which is an infinite dimensional func-
tion. This section provides a characterisation of Θ? that makes inference on it computationally
workable for sufficiently small networks, by building on results from Beresteanu, Molchanov, and
Molinari (2011) (hereafter, BMM).
More precisely, BMM show that the sharp identified set in the class of models with convex
moment predictions can be expressed as the set of parameter values satisfying a finite collection
of inequalities. Such inequalities are obtained by bounding the empirical probability distribution
of the observables and do not contain the equilibrium selection mechanism. Under Assumptions
1 and 2, this model belongs to the class of models analysed by BMM. Therefore, we start our
discussion by representing Θ? according to BMM’s approach.
19More formally, joint exchangeability of networks is defined as: P(G ∈ K|N = n,X = x) = P(G ∈ Kϕ|N =
n,X = xϕ), for every permutation ϕ of the labels in N, ∀K ⊆ G, ∀x ∈ Xn, and ∀n ∈ N, where Kϕ and xϕ are
obtained by applying ϕ respectively to K and x.
20Conversely, note that fixing the equilibrium selection mechanism does not ensure point identification of the
parameters.
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For simplicity of exposition and without loss of generality, let us assume that all the observed
networks have the same size, i.e., N is a degenerate random variable with support {n}, for any
n ∈ N \ {1, 2}. Let AG ⊂ KG be the collection of non-empty finite subsets of G obtained by
taking the Cartesian product of all the possible ordered n-tuples with repetition fromK{0,1}n−1 .21
For each θ ∈ Θ, consider the random closed set of equilibria of the network formation game,
Sθu(X, ) : Ω → AG. Note that Sθu(X, ) takes values in AG by the if and only if property.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, Theorem D.2 in BMM suggests that
Θ? =
{
θ ∈ Θ|P(G ∈ K|X = x) ≤ Tx,θ(K) ∀K ∈KG, ∀x ∈ Xn a.s.
}
, (5)
where Tx,θ : KG→ [0, 1] is the capacity functional of Sθu(X, ) conditional onX = x, prescribed
by
Tx,θ(K) ≡ P(Sθu(X, ) ∩K 6= ∅|X = x; θ) =
∫
e∈Rn(n−1) s.t. Sθu (x,e)∩K 6=∅
dF (e; θ),
∀K ∈KG.22,23 Each inequality in (5) is known as Artstein’s inequality, for a total of 22n(n−1)−2
Artstein’s inequalities ∀θ ∈ Θ and ∀x ∈ Xn.
Unfortunately, conducting inference on Θ? as characterised in (5) is computationally unman-
ageable even for n = 3 because it requires checking the violation in the data of an overwhelming
amount of inequalities.24 Moreover, the capacity functionals entering the inequalities in (5) de-
pend on the equilibria of the whole network formation game. Hence, they can be burdensome to
calculate by simulation if one naively opts for enumerating all the possible 2n(n−1) networks and
verifying whether each candidate satisfies the equilibrium conditions for each drawn realisation
of the taste shocks.
As an alternative route, in what follows we consider the region of parameter values cropped
by bounding the empirical probability distributions of the outcomes of the section 1 game,
..., section n game, rather than of the entire network formation game. We argue that, under
some restrictions on preference shocks and equilibrium selection, such an approach mitigates the
concerns illustrated above and makes inference on Θ? computationally workable when networks
are sufficiently small.
More formally, for each θ ∈ Θ and j ∈ N, let Sj,θu(X, ·j) : Ω → K{0,1}n−1 be the random
closed set of equilibria of the section j game, where ·j ≡ (ij ∀i ∈ N\ {j}).25 An additional
assumption is now introduced.
Assumption 3. (Independence)
a) The random vectors in the sequence {·j}j∈N are mutually independent.
b) The section 1 game, ..., section n game are endowed with mutually independent equilibrium
21|AG| = (22n−1 − 1)n < |KG| = 22n(n−1) − 1. See Appendix D for more details on how AG is constructed.
22The same characterisation can be obtained by applying some results from Galichon and Henry (2006; 2011).
23Throughout the paper and with some abuse of notation, “ ; θ” inside a probability indicates that the value
of the considered probability, as predicted by the model, depends on θ.
24For n = 3, 22
n(n−1) − 2 ≈ 1.845× 1019. For n ≥ 4, 22n(n−1) − 2 > 1080.
25Note that  ≡ (·1, ..., ·n).
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selection mechanisms, i.e.,
P(G·1 = g·1, ..., G·n = g·n|X,) = Πnj=1P(G·j = g·j |X, ·j),
∀g ≡ (g·1, ..., g·n) ∈ G and ∀x ∈ Xn.

Assumption 3 a) restricts Assumption 2 b) by not allowing ·j to be correlated with ·h,
∀(j, h) ∈ N2. In particular, under Assumption 3 a), the agents’ taste shocks can be correlated
through link target-specific unobserved heterogeneity, but not through link source-specific unob-
served heterogeneity. For example, Assumption 3 a) is satisfied if ij ≡ αj + ξij ∀(i, j) ∈ N2.
Assumption 3 a) is violated if ij ≡ αi + βj + ξij for some (i, j) ∈N2. Other papers on network
formation impose {ij}∀(i,j)∈N2 i.i.d., which is stronger than Assumption 3 a) (e.g., Menzel, 2016;
Sheng, 2016). Additionally, note that Assumption 3 a) allows for network sparsity by letting
the correlation among the preference shocks within ·j to appropriately depend on n ∀j ∈N, so
that nodes have a non-negligible probability of remaining isolated as n grows. More details on
this are in Leung (2015).
Assumption 3 b) is a local coordination condition. It strengthens the if and only if property
by requiring that the players of each local game coordinate on the selection of an equilibrium
independently across the local games. In other words, Assumption 3 b) excludes that the players
of the section j game select an outcome from the set of equilibria of the section j game by looking
at the equilibrium selection rule adopted by the players of the section h game, ∀(j, h) ∈N2. For
example, Assumption 3 b) is satisfied if the players of the section j game roll a die to select an
outcome from the set of equilibria of the section j game, independently across j. Assumption
3 b) is met if the players of the section j game roll a die to select the player who should
be privileged by the local bargaining process, independently across j. Myopic best-response
dynamics are contemplated by Assumption 3 b), i.e., when the players of the section j game
meet sequentially at random and choose which links to form by maximizing current utilities,
∀j ∈ N. Many papers in the literature assume equilibrium selection via myopic best-response
dynamics (e.g., Christakis, et al., 2010; Mele, 2017). Assumption 3 b) is violated if all the local
games systematically coordinate on an equilibrium penalising player k. A requirement similar
to Assumption 3 b) is imposed by Leung (2019) in a one-network setting and is referred to as
“decentralised selection”.
Lastly, some implications of Assumption 3 can be tested. In particular, under Assumptions
1, 2, and 3, it holds that
P(G = g|X) = Πnj=1P(G·j = g·j |X) ∀g ≡ (g·1, ..., g·n) ∈ G,
i.e., the random vectors in the sequence {G·j}j∈N are mutually independent conditional onX.26
This null hypothesis can be verified using any method in the literature for testing conditional
independence, e.g., Fukumizu, et al. (2008) and Zhang, et al. (2011).
26This is formally shown in step 2.3 of the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix C.
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Continuing with identification, define the set
Θ?? ≡
{
θ ∈ Θ|P(G·j ∈ Kj |X = x) ≤Tj,x,θ(Kj)




where Tj,x,θ : K{0,1}n−1 → [0, 1] is the capacity functional of Sj,θu(X, ·j) conditional on X = x,
prescribed by
Tj,x,θ(Kj) ≡ P(Sj,θu(X, ·j) ∩Kj 6= ∅|X = x; θ)
=
∫
e·j∈Rn−1 s.t. Sj,θu (x,e·j)∩K 6=∅
dFj(e·j ; θ),
∀Kj ∈K{0,1}n−1 , where Fj(·; θ) denotes ·j ’s cdf.
Proposition 3. (Sharp identified set under Assumptions 1, 2, 3) (i) Under Assumptions 1 and
2, Θ?? ⊇ Θ?. (ii) Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, Θ?? = Θ?. 
Intuitively, Proposition 3 can be read as follows. If the researcher is not willing to impose
Assumption 3, then Θ?? is an outer set of the sharp identified set. This is because, by ignoring
the relationships among the local games, Θ?? does not fully explore the empirical content of the
model. When Assumption 3 is included, the relationships among the local games are voided
of their empirical content. Therefore, considering the information provided by the probability
distributions of the local game outcomes is sufficient for sharpness. The proof of Proposition 3
in Appendix C formalises these arguments.
From a technical point of view, Proposition 3 shows that “thinking locally” entails a significant
reduction in the number of inequalities needed for sharpness. This is because the bounded
probability distributions have fewer mass points. In particular, the number of inequalities is
shortened to n(22n−1 − 2) << 22n(n−1) − 2, with a reducing factor of order O(22n2/n).27
Furthermore, differently from (5), the capacity functionals entering Artstein’s inequalities
in (6) are easily calculable via the simple frequency simulator proposed by McFadden (1989)
and Pakes and Pollard (1989), for two reasons. First, when bounding the empirical probability
distribution of G·j , the if and only if property implies that the involved capacity functionals
depend only on the set of equilibria of the section j game. Consequently, during the simulation
procedure, the researcher can look separately for the equilibria of the section 1 game, ..., section
n game, without needing to verify whether a potential equilibrium of the section j game is
compatible with an equilibrium of the whole network formation game ∀j ∈N. Second, in order
to determine the equilibria of the section j game, the researcher does not have to check the
equilibrium conditions for each possible realisation of G·j . Instead, the researcher can exploit
Corollary 1 to refine ex-ante the collection of realisations of G·j which can strive for being
equilibria. Specifically, if a candidate parameter value is such that vj(·; δ) is monotone increasing,
Tarski’s fixed point theorem guarantees existence of the greatest and least equilibria of the section
j game. These two equilibria can be computed from the best-response dynamics, where the
number of iterations for convergence is no more than (n− 1)2 (Topkis 1979). It follows that the
27For n = 3, n(22
n−1 − 2) = 42. For n = 4, n(22n−1 − 2) = 1016. For n = 5, n(22n−1 − 2) = 327670.
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researcher only has to verify whether the realisations of G·j lying between the greatest and least
equilibria are equilibria of the section j game. If a candidate parameter value is such that vj(·; δ)
is monotone decreasing, all the equilibria of the section j game are characterised by the same
number, n∗j , of players linking to player j. n
∗
j can be obtained by implementing the constructive
algorithm used to show existence of an equilibrium of the section j game.28 Thus, the researcher
only has to check whether the realisations of G·j characterised by n∗j players linking to player
j are equilibria of the section j game. The number of realisations of G·j characterised by n∗j











Before concluding, we recognise that the curse of dimensionality in the amount of inequalities
to consider for sharpness persists, despite substantially attenuated by the local approach. This is
an inherent aspect of sharpness in games with multiple equilibria which cannot be eliminated, but
just weakened, without further assumptions. When networks have sizes that make inference on
(6) unworkable, we recommend using a sub-collection of inequalities. As suggested by Ciliberto
and Tamer (2009) for entry games, one possibility is to consider the outer set of parameter values
such that the empirical probability of each realisation of G·j is between the probability of such
a realisation being the unique equilibrium of the section j game, and the probability of such a
realisation being a possible equilibrium of the section j game, ∀j ∈N. That is,
Θo ≡
{
θ ∈ Θ|P(G·j ∈ {0, 1}n−1 \ {g·j}|X = x) ≤ Tj,x,θ({0, 1}n−1 \ {g·j})




Note that, under Assumptions 1 and 2,Θo ⊇ Θ? because Θo ⊇ Θ?? by construction and Θ?? ⊇ Θ?
by Proposition 3 (i). If Assumption 3 is additionally satisfied, we expect Θo to become sharper.
We conclude by investigating the shapes of Θ? and Θo through some simulations. To generate
the data, we assume











with (β, δ) = (−0.5, 0.4) (hereafter, complementary effect case) or (β, δ) = (0.8,−0.9) (hereafter,
substitution effect case), {Xi}∀i∈N i.i.d., Xi ∼ Unif({0, 1}), {ij}∀(i,j)∈N2 i.i.d. and independent
ofX, and ij ∼N(0, 1). In case of multiple equilibria, we let players select one outcome uniformly
at random from the equilibrium set of each local game, independently across local games. Hence,
Assumption 3 is satisfied and Θ? = Θ??. Figure 5 plots Θ? and Θo for N = 3, 4, 5. The three
panels on the left are for the complementary effect case. The three panels on the right are for
the substitution effect case. In all the designs but one (N = 4, complementary effect case), the
loss of information induced by Θo with respect to Θ? is indiscernible. Figure 6 plots Θo and the
true parameter vector for N = 10, 12, 14. In all the designs, Θo provides extremely informative
bounds for the true parameter vector. Interestingly, in the complementary effect case Θo seems
to become larger as N grows, while the opposite trend takes place in the substitution effect
case.29
28See the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix C.
29The identified sets in Figures 5 and 6 seem convex. Convexity is not a generic feature of the model.
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Figure 5: Θ?, Θo, and the true parameter vector are plotted for N = 3, 4, 5. The three panels
on the left are obtained from specification (8) with (β, δ) = (−0.5, 0.4). The three panels on the
right are obtained from specification (8) with (β, δ) = (0.8,−0.9).
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Figure 6: Θo and the true parameter vector are plotted for N = 10, 12, 14. The three panels on
the left are obtained from specification (8) with (β, δ) = (−0.5, 0.4). The three panels on the
right are obtained from specification (8) with (β, δ) = (0.8,−0.9).
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Looking closer at our simulations, we found that the set of equilibria of the local games vary little across convex
combinations of parameters in the identified sets. This, combined with limitations in numerical precision, may
be the cause of the (apparently) convex shapes.
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4 Empirical illustration
This section applies our methodology to the study of Italian firms’ incentives for creating PHBIs.
Before proceeding, note that, for simplicity of exposition and without loss of generality, the
identification analysis of Section 3 focuses on the unilateral case. Appendix B explains how all
the results can be replicated for the bilateral case. The formation of PHBIs is an example of
bilateral agreement process.
4.1 The Italian context
The firms considered in the empirical illustration are Italian joint stock companies (Societá per
Azioni). Joint stock companies are business entities where the shareholders’ liability is limited
to the nominal value of held shares. They represent the largest organisations in Italy. They
are not necessarily listed on the stock exchange and are governed by a board of directors. The
board of directors is a collegial body appointed by the shareholders who are free to choose its
size. The board of directors can delegate its executive duties to one or more of its members
(Amministratori Delegati). If the mandate is conferred, then the executives have to report to
the board with a frequency determined by the company’s statute and, in any case, at least
every six months. The non-executives can ask the executives to provide the board with any
information related to the management of the firm and are supposed to monitor and inspire the
executives’ conduct for the good of the company (Articles 2381, 2392, and 2393 of the Italian
Civil Code).
The sharing of board members between joint stock companies has been a distinguishing
feature of Italian capitalism since the end of the nineteenth century (Luzzatto Fegiz, 1928; Bianco
and Pagnoni, 1997; Barbi, 2000; Rinaldi and Vasta, 2005; Bertoni and Randone, 2006; Ciocca,
2007; Santella, et al., 2009), with relatively stable dynamics over time (Vasta and Baccini, 1997;
Rinaldi and Vasta, 2005; 2012; Santella, Drago, and Polo, 2009; Bellenzier and Grassi, 2014).
The Italian legal system does not impose prohibitions on the sharing of board members,
limits on the number of different appointments that a director can hold, or restrictions on board
size. The only exception is Law 214 of the year 2011, which forbids organisations from sharing
board members with companies or groups operating in the banking, insurance, and financial
services sectors. Lastly, a director needs her original board’s approval to join the board of a
competitor (Article 2390 of the Italian Civil Code).
4.2 Specification of the network formation game
In this section we specify the network formation game for the empirical illustration at hand.
There are Nm ∈ N\{1, 2} firms within each industry m ∈ {1, ...,M}. The firms connect to each
other by allowing their executives to sit on competitors’ boards. Gij is equal to 1 if an executive
of firm i sits on firm j’s board. Links are nonreciprocal: Gij can be different from Gji because
i having an executive sitting on j’s board does not imply j having an executive sitting on i’s
board. The consent of both i and j is necessary for the formation of the link ij. When Gij = 1,
we assume that i and j cannot transfer utility.
Firms i and j are not considered connected when they share a director with non-executive
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duties at both such firms. Indeed, the literature suggests that only ties involving executive
powers can represent long term economic and institutional relations between companies. Instead,
non-executive directors often sit temporarily on multiple boards because of their technical skills,
rather than to transfer information across firms (Mizruchi and Bunting, 1981; Stokman, Wasseur,
and Elsas, 1985; Stokman, Van Der Knoop, and Wasseur, 1988). With this assumption, we want
to remain conservative on the amount of information channels among firms incorporated in the
analysis. If more information channels are present in reality (e.g., via the sharing of non-executive
directors or via equity participations), then our results can be interpreted as underestimated.
Figure 7 displays an example of network arising in an industry composed by five firms.
On the left, the board composition of every firm is indicated by two sets of letters. Each letter
denotes a board member. The first set of letters is the set of executives. The second set of letters
is the set of non-executives. The picture on the right shows how the network is constructed.
Figure 7: This figure reports an example of network arising in an industry composed by five
firms. On the left, the board composition of every firm is indicated by two sets of letters. Each
letter denotes a board member. The first set of letters is the set of executives. The second
set of letters is the set of non-executives. The picture on the right shows how the network is
constructed.
We assume that an executive of firm i represents i’s will when participating in firm j’s board
meetings with non-executive duties. We also assume that an executive of i carries on i and j’s
wills when participating in j’s board meetings with executive duties. Hence, we ignore directors’
identities and interpret “Gij = 1, Gji = 0” as “company i attends company j’s board meetings,
company j does not attend company i’s board meetings” and “Gij = 1, Gji = 1” as “company i
attends company j’s board meetings, company j attends company i’s board meetings”.
In accordance with corporate laws, when Gij = 1, firms i and j interact with different roles.
In particular, i has the right to learn everything about j’s decision making process and it is
supposed to monitor and inspire j’s conduct for the good of the company. Conversely, j can
benefit from i’s guidance. Along these lines, the literature suggests various scenarios that could
underlie the formation of the link ij (Selznick, 1949; Thompson and McEwen, 1958; Dooley,
1969; Allen, 1974; Bunting, 1976; Carrington, 1981; Mizruchi, 1996). Specifically, from the
point of view of firm i, on one hand, supervising the decision making process of smaller and
less profitable competitors may be favoured because smaller and less profitable competitors
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are more likely to undertake ambitious strategies with the objective of growing but potentially
destabilising the industry’s pace. On the other hand, according to a “learning from better
practices” perspective, i could prefer sitting on boards of directors of bigger and more profitable
competitors. Additionally, i may want to join boards targeted also by other competitors, in
order to promote meetings with as many industry actors as possible and, in turn, facilitate
information flow. Conversely, from the point of view of firm j, on one hand, hosting executives
of smaller and less profitable companies may be favoured because j might feel more vulnerable
and controlled if exposed to organisations playing a leading role in the industry. On the other
hand, hosting executives of bigger and more profitable competitors could represent a source of
inspiring guidance and new opportunities.
Our methodology can be used to shed light on such conjectures by modelling firm i’s payoff
as





Payoff that firm i gets
from attending
firm j’s board meetings︷ ︸︸ ︷










lji(X, ; γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoff that firm i gets
when firm j




whereX collects the firms’ covariates, such as size and profitability,  ≡ (i ∀i ∈N), i ≡ (ηi, ζi),
ηi ≡ (ηij ∀j ∈N\ {i}), ζi ≡ (ζji ∀j ∈N\ {i}), ηij ∈ R is i’s taste shock for the link ij, ζji ∈ R




Lastly, note that cases in which firms share board members with companies operating in
different industries, i.e., vertical ties, are not taken into account. In fact, before the year 2011,31
in Italy vertical ties are mostly driven by connections with financial institutions, possibly arising
because experts in the financial industry are useful to firms operating in other industries, or
because lending banks want to control debtors’ boards. The study of such financial links may
require a payoff structure more sophisticated than (9) and it is outside the scope of our paper.
Additionally, the current policy debate focuses on incentives behind the existence of ties within
industries, rather than across industries, given the potential impact on competition.
4.3 Data
The sources of data are the Registro Imprese and the Cerved databases, whose access has
been provided by the Bank of Italy. The Registro Imprese is a database in which all Italian
companies are required to enrol through the Chamber of Commerce in their territorial province
and is the primary source of certification of their constituent data. It offers accurate and updated
information on individual firms (e.g., legal status, year of registration, composition of governance
30Note that Gji = 1 does not imply that i can interact with the competitors participating in j’s board
meetings. This is why vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}Gkj ; δ) is absent from lji(·; γ). Also, we assume away any dependence of
lji(·; γ) on ∑k∈N\{j}Gki, such as a cost term depending on the total number of incoming links that firm i has
already formed.
31That is, prior to the time this was forbidden by Law 214 of 2011. Note that our study uses data of 2010, as
explained in Section 4.3.
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bodies, geographical location, and principle line of activity) and on important changes related to
their existence (e.g., termination, liquidation, bankruptcy, and mergers and acquisitions). The
Cerved database contains information useful for measuring the credit risk of Italian companies
and provides balance sheet details.
Our sample collects all Italian joint stock companies with a governance organised under the
Articles 2380-2409 of the Italian Civil Code (Societá per Azioni con sistema tradizionale) and
whose data for the year 2010 were available, i.e., 2599 firms operating in M = 386 industries.
The board composition and the role of each director (executive or non-executive) are ex-
tracted from the Registro Imprese database. Industries are constructed considering the firms’
principal lines of activity provided by the 5 digit-ATECO 2002 code, also obtained from the
Registro Imprese database. The ATECO 2002 code is similar to the SIC code in the UK and
US. It is unique for each firm.
The existing empirical studies on board interlocks measure firm size and profitability in
various ways. We measure firm size using total assets (hereafter, TA), as per Dooley (1969),
Allen (1974), and Mizruchi and Stearns (1988; 1994). We measure firm profitability using return
on equity (hereafter, ROE), as per Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Fligstein and Brantley
(1992). Our choice to measure firm size and profitability using TA and ROE is mainly driven by
data quality considerations. TA and ROE are extracted from the Cerved database. Additional
control variables are not included to keep the inference part tractable.
More details on data, cleaning steps, and descriptive statistics are in Appendix ?? of the
supplementary material.
4.4 Results
In this section we construct a 95% confidence region for the identified set characterised in Section
3 using the data described above. As the observed networks have up to 15 players, we focus
on the outer set Θo, rather on the sharp identified set. To simplify the computation, TA and
ROE are discretised into five separate bins, according to their 20-th, 40-th, ..., 80-th quantiles.
The inference method developed by Andrews and Soares (2010) is implemented, as illustrated
in Appendix ?? of the supplementary material.
Before presenting the results, let us add few clarifying remarks. First, the number of players,
N , varies across the observed networks. In particular, the realisations of N observed in the data
are {3, 4, ..., 15}. Hence, N is treated as a covariate and the moment inequalities involve the
empirical probability distribution of G conditional on both N and X. Second, given a candidate
parameter value, the number of moment inequalities to check for each observed realisation
of the covariates, (n,x), is 2n × 2n−1. Third, the firms’ identities vary across the observed
networks and the firms have no specific roles. Thus, the labels are assigned arbitrarily to the
firms within each network. As discussed in Section 3.3, when doing inference and replacing
probabilities with sample analogues, the researcher needs to ensure that the label assignment
does not affect estimates. We achieve this by imposing sufficient conditions such that the
probability distribution of G conditional on (N,X) is invariant under permutations of the
labels, as outlined by Sheng (2016). More details are in Appendix ?? of the supplementary
material.
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We consider the following payoff specification:



















Regarding the structure of the taste shocks, we define ηij (i.e, firm i’s taste shock for attending
firm j’s board meetings) and ζij (i.e., firm j’s taste shock for allowing firm i to attend j’s board
meetings) as
ηij ≡ τij + αj , ζij ≡ ωij + φj ∀(i, j) ∈N2.
αj , φj represent some firm j-specific unobserved heterogeneity that all the agents take into
account when playing the section j game. Note that αj enters ηij ∀i ∈ N\ {j} and φj enters
ζij ∀i ∈ N\ {j}. In line with Assumption 3 a), this allows for link target-specific unobserved
heterogeneity but not for link source-specific unobserved heterogeneity.32 All the latent terms
are i.i.d. standard normals independent of (N,X).
Table 1 reports the hypercube that contains the 95% confidence region for each θ ∈ Θo.33
λ0 [10.870 177.240]
λ1 [−128.453, − 24.637]
λ2 [−413.811, − 143.719]
δ [58.060, 149.446]
γ0 [−240.590, − 99.976]
γ1 [30.044, 145.750]
γ2 [23.288, 208.275]
Table 1: This table reports the projections of the 95% confidence region for each θ ∈ Θo according
to model specification (10).
The sign of various effects, as measured by projections of this hypercube, is analysed first.
The projection for the parameter δ is [58.060, 149.446]. The positive sign reveals that, all
else equal, firm i’s payoff from attending firm j’s board meetings increases with the number of
other rival companies participating in j’s board assemblies. The projections for the parameters
λ1 and λ2 are, respectively, [−128.453, − 24.637] and [−413.811, − 143.719], and indicate
that, all else equal, i prefers to attend j’s board meetings when j is smaller and less profitable
than i. The projections for the parameters γ1 and γ2 are, respectively, [30.044, 145.750] and
[23.288, 208.275] and suggests that, all else equal, j prefers to host i on its board when i is
smaller and less profitable than j.
The signs of the projections shed some light on the qualitative predictions proposed in
the literature and discussed in Section 4.2. In particular, the negative signs of λ1 and λ2
support the idea that supervising the decision making process of smaller and less profitable
competitors may be favoured, because they are more likely to undertake ambitious strategies
with the objective of growing but potentially destabilising the industry’s pace. The positive
32Results for the case including link source-specific unobserved heterogeneity are similar and not reported.
33This implies that the reported intervals may be too conservative. At the same time, such excess of conser-
vativeness suggests that the results are robust in terms of the sign of various effects.
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signs of γ1 and γ2 suggest that firms may choose to host on their boards executives of smaller
and less profitable companies because firms perceive themselves more vulnerable and controlled
if exposed to organisations playing a leading role in the industry. Lastly, the positive sign of δ
confirms that, when firms decide whether to allow their executives to join rivals’ boards, they
may prefer companies targeted also by other competitors, in order to promote meetings with as
many industry actors as possible and, in turn, facilitate information flow.
To examine the magnitude of results, one may study how some network summary statistics
(e.g., density, average degree, percentage of isolated nodes, and number of links) vary as a con-
sequence of changes in TA or ROE. Various experiments are possible. As an example (hereafter,
Experiment I), Table 2 reports the outcome of the following procedure. Within each industry,
we merge the firms with TA value falling in the 20-th quantile into one new firm with TA and
ROE equal to the sum of TA and ROE across the merged firms. We draw several realisations
of the taste shocks. For each drawn realisation of the taste shocks and for each parameter value
in the 95% confidence region, we find the set of equilibrium networks. We compute the density,
the average degree, the percentage of isolated nodes and the total number of links in every equi-
librium network, and record their minimum and maximum values across equilibrium networks.
Then, we average the bounds across the drawn realisations of taste shocks and industries. Fi-
nally, we report the smallest lower bound and the largest upper bound across parameter values
in the second and third columns of Table 2. The same experiment is repeated without merging
companies and the results appear in the fourth and sixth columns of Table 2. The observed
empirical values are in the fifth column of Table 2. As a consequence of the simulated shift, the
upper bounds on density, average degree, and number of links decrease, while the lower bound
on the percentage of isolated nodes increases. Hence, when merging the smallest firms within
each industry (and thus impeding them from creating PHBIs among each other), networks can
have more isolated nodes and become more disconnected.
New New Old Empirical Old
lower bound upper bound lower bound value upper bound
Density 0 0.102 0 0.005 0.108
Average Degree 0 0.789 0 0.022 0.940
% Isolated nodes 57.174 100 55.031 97.666 100
Number of links 0 7.821 0 0.163 10.375
Table 2: This table reports the bounds on some network summary statistics when Experiment
I is run.
As an alternative experiment, we analyse the impact on firms’ payoffs of a policy preventing
the biggest firms within each industry from forming links. Specifically, the following procedure
is implemented. Within each industry, we delete the firms with a TA value falling in the 60-th
and 80-th quantiles. We draw several realisations of the taste shocks. For each drawn realisation
of the taste shocks and for each parameter value in the 95% confidence region, we find the set
of equilibrium networks. We compute the average of the firms’ payoffs and record its minimum
and maximum values across the equilibrium networks. Then, we average the bounds across the
drawn realisations of taste shocks and industries. Finally, we save the smallest lower bound
and the largest upper bound across parameter values. The same experiment is repeated without
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deleting any firm. As a consequence of the simulated intervention, we find that the largest upper
bound is 71.848% lower than in the original setting. This reveals that companies may be on
average worse off if the largest firms are not allowed to create PHBIs.
5 Conclusions
We study a static game of network formation featuring complete information, nonreciprocal
links, and a relatively small number of players. The payoff that player i gets from linking to
player j is allowed to depend on the number of other players linking to j. Economic theory
suggests that this spillover effect has a key role in many applications of interest, e.g., PHBIs,
hyperlinks among news websites, advice-seeking ties, and trading networks. As the game admits
multiple equilibria, we provide partial identification arguments for the payoff parameters, under
the assumption that the researcher has data on several equilibrium networks. The structure
assigned to the players’ preferences is leveraged to simplify the problem. In particular, the
spillover effect considered permits us to decompose the network formation game into some local
games such that the network formation game is in equilibrium if and only if each local game
is in equilibrium. This if and only if relation reveals that the set of equilibria of the network
formation game is the Cartesian product of the set of equilibria of the local games, which thereby
substantially decreases the curse of dimensionality in the analysis. The methodology developed
is used to learn about Italian firms’ incentives for forming PHBIs. We find that, all else equal,
firm i’s payoff from having an executive sitting on competitor j’s board increases with the
number of other rival companies having an executive appointed by j. Such a result confirms
that the creation of PHBIs is motivated by information sharing purposes, as conjectured in the
literature.
There are several directions to take for future research. For example, it may be of interest
to investigate whether it is possible to characterise a general class of games satisfying the if and
only if property or to remove the parametric distributional assumption on the latent variables.
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A Weaker sufficient conditions for Proposition 1
Proposition 1 holds also under a weaker version of Assumption 1.
Assumption 1′. (Spillover effect - weak)
a) ui(·; θu) is additively separable in player i’s outgoing links, i.e.,
ui(G,X, ; θu) ≡
∑
j∈N\{i}
Gij × uij(G−{i·},X, ; θu), (A.1)
where uij(·; θu) is the payoff that i gets from forming the link ij.
b) Only player j’s incoming links affect uij(·; θu), i.e.,
uij(G−{i·},X, ; θu) ≡ uij((Gkj ∀k ∈N\ {i, j}),X, ; θu). (A.2)

B The bilateral case
This section explains how all the results of Section 3 can be replicated for the bilateral case. We
remind the reader that, even if the formation of links is now treated as a bilateral agreement
process, the focus remains on nonreciprocal links, i.e., Gij can be different from Gji for any
(i, j) ∈N2.
B.1 The bilateral case with non-transferable payoffs
Each player i ∈ N is endowed with some predetermined characteristics, (Xi, i). Xi ∈ X ⊆
RK is observed by the researcher. i ≡ (ηi, ζi) ∈ R2(N−1) is unobserved by the researcher.
ηi ≡ (ηij ∀j ∈ N \ {i}) ∈ RN−1, where ηij represents player i’s taste shock for the link ij.
ζi ≡ (ζji ∀j ∈N\ {i}) ∈ RN−1, where ζji represents player i’s taste shock for the link ji. X ≡
(Xi ∀i ∈N) and  ≡ (i ∀i ∈N) are common knowledge to all the players. The payoff that player
i gets from participating in the game depends on (G,X, ) and is denoted by ui(G,X, ; θu),
where θu ∈ Θu ⊆ Rdu is a vector of parameters. The players announce the desired outgoing and
incoming links. Links form if they are mutually beneficial. The equilibrium concept is pairwise
stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). G ∈ G is a pairwise stable (hereafter, PS) network if it
is robust to unilateral one-link deletion and bilateral one-link formation.34 Utility transfers are
not allowed.
34One may want to use an equilibrium concept stronger than pairwise stability, e.g., pure strategy pairwise
Nash stability. In our model, pairwise stability and pure strategy pairwise Nash stability coincide.
More precisely, pure strategy pairwise Nash stable networks are robust to unilateral multi-link deletion and
bilateral one-link formation (Jackson and Wolinski, 1996; Calvó-Armengol, 2004; Bloch and Jackson, 2005, 2006;
Goyal and Joshi, 2006; Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç, 2009). Therefore, the set of pure strategy pairwise Nash stable
networks is the intersection between the set of Nash stable networks (constructed by letting players announce
the desired outgoing and incoming links, according to PSNE, and, then, forming the mutually announced links)
and the set of PS networks. Gilles and Sarangi (2005) show that if payoffs are network convex (as in our model
under Assumption B.1), then the set of PS networks coincides with the set of pure strategy pairwise Nash stable
networks.
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Definition B.1. (PS network without transfers) G ∈ G is a PS network without transfers if
Gij = 1{∆iij(G−{ij},X, ; θu) ≥ 0} × 1{∆jij(G−{ij},X, ; θu) ≥ 0} ∀(i, j) ∈N2, (B.1)
where
∆iij(G−{ij},X, ; θu) ≡ ui((1,G−{ij}),X, ; θu)− ui((0,G−{ij}),X, ; θu),
∆jij(G−{ij},X, ; θu) ≡ uj((1,G−{ij}),X, ; θu)− uj((0,G−{ij}),X, ; θu),
are the payoffs that players i and j receive when forming the link ij respectively, G−{ij} denotes
the matrix G without Gij , (1,G−{ij}) is the matrix G with Gij = 1, and (0,G−{ij}) is the
matrix G with Gij = 0. 
Assumption 1 can be reformulated as follows.
Assumption B.1. (Spillover effect)
a) ui(·; θu) is additively separable in player i’s outgoing and incoming links, i.e.,
ui(G,X, ; θu) ≡
∑
j∈N\{i}
Gij × wij(G−{i·,·i},X, ; θu,1) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
Gji × lji(G−{i·,·i},X, ; θu,2),
(B.2)
where G−{i·,·i} denotes the matrix G without i’s outgoing and incoming links, wij(·; θu) is
the payoff that i gets from forming the link ij, lji(·; θu) is the payoff that i gets from forming
the link ji, and θu ≡ (θu,1, θu,2).
b) wij(·; θu,1) is additively separable in (X, ) and G−{i·,·i}. Moreover, wij(·; θu,1) depends
on G−{i·,·i} only through the number of player j’s incoming links and this dependence is
monotonic. Specifically,
wij(G−{i·,·i},X, ; θu,1) ≡ rij(X, ;λ) + vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}
Gkj ; δ), (B.3)
where λ and δ are vectors of parameters, θu,1 ≡ (λ, δ), and vj(·; δ) is monotone in
∑
k∈N\{i}Gkj .
c) lji(·; θu,2) does not depend on G−{i·,·i}, i.e.,
lji(G−{i·,·i},X, ; θu,2) ≡ lji(X, ; θu,2). (B.4)
Let us make some notational remarks to avoid any misinterpretation. Under Assumption
B.1, Definition B.1 becomes: G ∈ G is a PS network if
Gij = 1{rij(X, ;λ) + vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}
Gkj ; δ) ≥ 0} × 1{lij(X, ; θu,2) ≥ 0} ∀(i, j) ∈N2.
Given this definition, we remind the reader that, in equilibrium, Gij = 1 if
rij(X, ;λ) + vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}
Gkj ; δ) ≥ 0 and lij(X, ; θu,2) ≥ 0,
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while Gji = 1 if
rji(X, ;λ) + vi(
∑
k∈N\{j}
Gki; δ) ≥ 0 and lji(X, ; θu,2) ≥ 0.
As Assumption B.1 highlights, in the bilateral case the focus of our work remains on the
same spillover effect as in the unilateral case. Such spillover effect has a key role in many
applications of economic interest, as discussed in Section 3.1 with four examples. In particular,
three out of those four examples typically feature a bilateral agreement process. These are
PHBIs, advice-seeking ties, and trading networks. In all the three cases it is reasonable to
assume that lij(X, ; θu,2) does not depend on vi(
∑
k∈N\{j}Gki; δ). Specifically, with regards
to PHBIs, the reader can refer to Section 4.2 for explanations. With regards to advice-seeking
ties, Gij = 1 if agent i consults agent j. The payoff that j gets from giving advice to i is not
expected to depend on i’s reputation, which is proxied by the number of agents seeking i for
advice. With regards to trading networks, consider a group of companies each offering a different
service, e.g., legal, accounting, consulting, marketing, etc. Suppose that every company has to
choose between internalising and buying from other firms in the group any service needed for
operational activities. Gij = 1 if firm i buys firm j’s service. Given that each company offers a
different service, sellers do not compete for buyers. Therefore, the payoff that j gets from selling
to i is not expected to depend on the number of additional sellers bargaining with i.
Lastly, Assumption B.1 excludes any dependence of lij(·; γ) on
∑
k∈N\{i}Gkj , such as a cost
term depending on the total number of incoming links that player j has already formed.
The analysis in Section 3 can be adapted to model (B.1) after having replaced Assumption
1 with Assumption B.1 and defined ij ≡ (ηij , ζij).
B.2 The bilateral case with transferable payoffs
When transfers are allowed, assumptions on strategies, preferences, and information follow Sec-
tion B.1. Instead, the notion of pairwise stability should be changed as follows (Bloch and
Jackson, 2006).
Definition B.2. (PS network with transfers) G ∈ G is a PS network with transfers if
Gij = 1{∆iij(G−{ij},X, ; θu) + ∆jij(G−{ij},X, ; θu) ≥ 0} ∀(i, j) ∈N2. (B.5)

The analysis in Section 3 can be adapted to model (B.5) after having replaced Assumption
1 with Assumption B.1 and defined ij ≡ ηij + ζij .
C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that, under Assumption 1 a),
Gij = 1{uij(G−{i·},X, ; θu) ≥ 0},
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is equivalent to
ui(Gij ,G−{ij},X, ; θu) ≥ ui(G˜ij ,G−{ij},X, ; θu) ∀G˜ij ∈ {0, 1}, (C.1)
and to
(Gij − G˜ij)× uij(G−{i·},X, ; θu) ≥ 0 ∀G˜ij ∈ {0, 1}. (C.2)
It is firstly proved that, under Assumption 1 a), ifG ∈ G is a PSNE of the network formation
game, then (C.1) is satisfied ∀(i, j) ∈ N2. For any (i, j) ∈ N2, let Gi·,−{ij} be the vector Gi·
with the ij-th element removed. By setting G˜i· ≡ (G˜ij , Gi·,−{ij}) in ui(Gi·,G−{i·},X, ; θu) ≥
ui(G˜i·,G−{i·},X, ; θu) of Definition 1 for each G˜ij ∈ {0, 1}, it follows that (C.1) is satisfied.
Conversely, it is proved that, under Assumption 1 a), if the RHS of (C.2) holds ∀(i, j) ∈N2,
thenG ∈ G is a PSNE of the network formation game. For any i ∈N, if (C.2) holds ∀j ∈N\{i},
then, ∑
j∈N\{i}
(Gij − G˜ij)× uij(G−{i·},X, ; θu) ≥ 0 ∀G˜i· ≡ (G˜ij ∀j ∈N\ {i}) ∈ {0, 1}N−1,
m∑
j∈N\{i}
Gij × uij(G−{i·},X, ; θu) ≥
∑
j∈N\{i}
G˜ij × uij(G−{i·},X, ; θu) ∀G˜i· ∈ {0, 1}N−1,
m by Assumption 1 a)
ui(Gi·,G−{i·},X, ; θu) ≥ ui(G˜i·,G−{i·},X, ; θu) ∀G˜i· ∈ {0, 1}N−1.
Hence, by Definition 1, G ∈ G is a PSNE of the network formation game.
Proof of Proposition 1. It is firstly proved that, under Assumption 1, ifG ≡ (G·1, G·2, ..., G·N ) ∈
G is a PSNE of the network formation game, then G·j ∈ {0, 1}N−1 is a PSNE of the sec-
tion j game ∀j ∈ N. By Lemma 1, if G is a PSNE of the network formation game, then
Gij = 1{zij(X, ;β) + vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}Gkj ; δ) ≥ 0} ∀i ∈N\ {j}, which is the definition of a PSNE
of the section j games (Definition 2). This holds ∀j ∈N.
Conversely, under Assumption 1, if G·j ∈ {0, 1}N−1 is a PSNE of the section j game ∀j ∈N,
then G ≡ (G·1, G·2, ..., G·N ) ∈ G is a PSNE of the network formation game. Indeed, by stacking
one after the other the N systems of equations characterising a PSNE of the section 1 game ...,
section N game, we obtain the system of equations of Lemma 1, which defines a PSNE of the
network formation game.
Theorem C.1. (Tarski’s fixed point theorem) Let Q(·) be a monotone increasing function from
a non-empty complete lattice A into A. Then, the set of fixed points of Q(·) in A is a non-empty
complete lattice. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any j ∈ N. It is firstly discussed the case where vj(·; δ) is
monotone increasing. Let
hij(G·j) ≡ 1{zij(X, ;β) + vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}
Gkj ; δ) ≥ 0},
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Hence, h : {0, 1}N−1 → {0, 1}N−1. We now show that the sufficient conditions of Theorem
C.1 are satisfied when vj(·; δ) is monotone increasing, which, in turn, guarantees existence of a
PSNE of the section j game. Let the comparison between vectors be coordinate-wise, i.e., for
any G·j , G˜·j ∈ {0, 1}N−1,
G·j ≥ G˜·j ⇔ Gij ≥ G˜ij ∀i ∈N\ {j}.
Thus, G·j = G˜·j if and only if G·j ≥ G˜·j and G·j ≤ G˜·j . Moreover, G·j and G˜·j are unordered
if and only if neither G·j ≥ G˜·j nor G·j ≤ G˜·j . Therefore, {0, 1}N−1 is a lattice, i.e, a set
with a partial order. As {0, 1}N−1 is a finite lattice, it is complete. Furthermore, if vj(·; δ) is
monotone increasing, then h is a monotone increasing function. In fact, consider two vectors
G·j ≥ G˜·j . Since Gij ≥ G˜ij ∀i ∈N\{j}, then zij(X, ;β)+vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}Gkj ; δ) ≥ zij(X, ;β)+
vj(
∑
k∈N\{i} G˜kj ; δ) ∀i ∈ N\ {j}. Hence, h(G·j) ≥ h(G˜·j) and the sufficient conditions of the
theorem are met.
Consider the case where vj(·; δ) is monotone decreasing. As explained in Section 3.2, the
section j game when vj(·; δ) is monotone decreasing is similar in structure to an entry game with
substitution effects. Existence of a PSNE in an entry game with substitution effects is proved
by Berry (1992) through a constructive proof which can be reinterpreted for the section j game
as follows. Let Yij ≡ zij(X, ;β). The elements in the sequence {Yij}∀i∈N\{j} are ordered from
largest to smallest. Let k ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} denote the position of Yij in the ordered list and let
pi be a function such that pi(ij) = k, ∀i ∈ N\ {j}. By replacing the subscript ij with k, the
ordered sequence is
Y1 ≥ Y2 ≥ ... ≥ Yk ≥ ... ≥ YN−1.
Let Y0 ≡ max{Y1,−vj(−1; δ)}. n∗j is defined as the largest element of the set of integers
{0, 1, ..., N − 1} satisfying Yn∗j + vj(n∗j − 1; δ) ≥ 0, i.e.
n∗j ≡ max{k ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}|Yk + vj(k − 1; δ) ≥ 0}.
Consider G·j with Gij = 1 if pi(ij) ≤ n∗j and Gij = 0 otherwise. One can see that G·j is a PSNE
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of the section j game. In fact, given the definition of n∗j ,
Y0 + vj(−1; δ) ≥ 0 (a),




j − 1; δ) ≥ 0 (c),
Yn∗j+1 + vj(n
∗
j ; δ) < 0 (d),
Yn∗j+2 + vj(n
∗
j + 1; δ) < 0 (e),
...
YN−1 + vj(N − 2; δ) < 0 (f).
We know that G·j is a PSNE of the section j game iff the following inequalities are satisfied
Y1 + vj(n
∗
j − 1; δ) ≥ 0 (g),
Y2 + vj(n
∗




j − 1; δ) ≥ 0 (i),
Yn∗j+1 + vj(n
∗
j ; δ) < 0 (l),
Yn∗j+2 + vj(n
∗
j ; δ) < 0 (m),
...
YN−1 + vj(n∗j ; δ) < 0 (n).
By observing that inequalities (g), (h), ... ,(i) are implied by inequality (c) - as Y1 ≥ Y2 ≥ ... ≥
Yn∗j - and all the other inequalities follow from inequality (d) - as Yn∗j+1 ≥ Yn∗j+2 ≥ ... ≥ YN−1
-, it can be concluded that G·j is a PSNE of the section j game.
For the bilateral case with non-transferable payoffs illustrated in Section B.1, one can proceed
analogously after having changed the equilibrium notion and imposed
hij(G·j) ≡ 1{rij(X, ;λ) + vj(
∑
k∈N\{i}
Gkj ; δ) ≥ 0} × 1{lij(X, ; θu,2) ≥ 0},
∀i ∈N\ {j} when vj(·; δ) is monotone increasing, and
Yij ≡
rij(X, ;λ) if lij(X, ; θu,2) ≥ 0−∞ otherwise,
∀i ∈N\ {j} when vj(·; δ) is monotone decreasing.
Proof of Corollary 1. The first statement of Corollary 1 is a direct application of Tarski’s
fixed point theorem. The second statement is now shown. As in Berry (1992), take the PSNE
of the section j game constructed in the proof of Proposition 2. Suppose there exists another
equilibrium with k∗ > n∗j links. In this equilibrium, some of the players associated with inequal-
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ities (l), (m),..., (n) above should be willing to form a link pointing to player j. However, none
of them are happy to do so because inequalities (l), (m),..., (n) imply that
Yn∗j+1 + vj(k
∗ − 1; δ) < 0 (l’),
Yn∗j+2 + vj(k
∗ − 1; δ) < 0 (m’),
...
YN−1 + vj(k∗ − 1; δ) < 0 (n’).
Therefore, there cannot be an equilibrium with k∗ > n∗j links.
Suppose there exists another equilibrium with k∗ < n∗j links. In this equilibrium, some of
the players associated with inequalities (g), (h),..., (i) above should be willing not to form a link
pointing to player j. However, all of them will deviate, as inequalities (g), (h),..., (i) imply that
Y1 + vj(k
∗; δ) ≥ 0 (g’),
Y2 + vj(k
∗; δ) ≥ 0 (h’),
...
Yn∗j + vj(k
∗; δ) ≥ 0 (i’).
Therefore, that there cannot be an equilibrium with k∗ < n∗j links.
Proof of Corollary 2. By Proposition 2, under Assumption 1, there exists a PSNE of the
section j game ∀j ∈N. By Proposition 1, under Assumption 1, if G·j ∈ {0, 1}N−1 is a PSNE of
the section j game ∀j ∈N, then G ≡ (G·1, G·2, ..., G·N ) ∈ G is a PSNE of the network formation
game. Therefore, under Assumption 1, the network formation game has a PSNE.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is articulated as follows: step 1 shows that, under As-
sumptions 1 and 2, Θ?? ⊇ Θ?; step 2 shows that, under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, Θ?? = Θ?.
Step 1 We show that, under Assumptions 1 and 2, Θ?? ⊇ Θ?. Specifically, we prove that if
θ ∈ Θ is such that
P(G ∈ K|X = x) ≤ Tx,θ(K) ∀K ∈KG, ∀x ∈ Xn a.s., (C.3)
then
P(G·j ∈ Kj |X = x) ≤ Tj,x,θ(Kj) ∀Kj ∈K{0,1}n−1 , ∀j ∈N, ∀x ∈ Xn a.s. (C.4)
For any j ∈N and Kj ∈K{0,1}n−1 , take K ∈ AG corresponding to
{0, 1}n−1×...×{0, 1}n−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−1 times




where× is the Cartesian product operator. By Proposition 1, (C.3) is equivalent to
P(G·1 ∈ {0, 1}n−1, ..., G·j−1 ∈ {0, 1}n−1, G·j ∈ Kj , G·j+1 ∈ {0, 1}n−1, ..., G·n ∈ {0, 1}n−1|X = x)
≤ P(S1,θu(X, ·1) ∩ {0, 1}n−1 6= ∅, ...,Sj−1,θu(X, ·j−1) ∩ {0, 1}n−1 6= ∅,Sj,θu(X, ·j) ∩Kj 6= ∅,
Sj+1,θu(X, ·j+1) ∩ {0, 1}n−1 6= ∅, ...,Sn,θu(X, ·n) ∩ {0, 1}n−1 6= ∅|X = x; θ),
∀x ∈ Xn a.s., which is equivalent to
P(G·j ∈ Kj |X = x) ≤ P(Sj,θu(X, ·j) ∩Kj 6= ∅|X = x; θ),
∀x ∈ Xn a.s. By repeating the same arguments ∀Kj ∈K{0,1}n−1 and ∀j ∈N, all the inequalities
in (C.4) are obtained.
Step 2 We show that, under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, Θ?? = Θ?. As discussed in step 1, under
Assumptions 1 and 2, if θ ∈ Θ? then θ ∈ Θ??. Hence, it is left to prove that, under Assumptions
1, 2, and 3, if θ ∈ Θ?? then θ ∈ Θ?.
Step 2.1 Under Assumption 2, we rewrite Θ? and Θ?? using more handy expressions by
building on results from BMM. In what follows, given a random set A, Sel(A) denotes the
collection of its selections.
By the definition of selection, g : Ω→ Gbelongs to Sel(Sθu(X, )) if g(ω) ∈ Sθu(X(ω), (ω))
a.s. Similarly, g·j : Ω → {0, 1}n−1 belongs to Sel(Sj,θu(X, ·j)) if g·j(ω) ∈ Sj,θu(X(ω), ·j(ω))
a.s.35 Moreover, by Proposition 1,
g ≡ (g·1, ...,g·n) ∈ Sel(Sθu(X, ))⇔ g·j ∈ Sel(Sj,θu(X, ·j)) ∀j ∈N.
Given the selection g ≡ (g·1, ...,g·n) ∈ Sel(Sθu(X, )) and the realisation g ≡ (g·1, ..., g·n) ∈
G, let Egθu,g ⊆ Rn(n−1) be the collection of realisations of  such that the players choose to play
g in the network formation game. Let Eg·jθu,g·j ⊆ Rn−1 be the collection of realisations of ·j such
that the players choose to play g·j in the section j game. Define
qg ≡ (1{ ∈ Egθu,g} ∀g ∈ G),
of size 2n(n−1) × 1. Note that, by Proposition 1,
qg = (Π
n
j=11{·j ∈ Eg·jθu,g·j} ∀(g·1, ..., g·n) ∈ G). (C.5)
Let
Qθu(X, ) ≡ {qg|g ∈ Sel(Sθu(X, ))}.
Qθu(X, ) can be shown to be a random closed set. As all the selections of Qθu(X, ) are
35Note the difference in notation: calligraphic small letters denote selections, non-calligraphic small letters
denote realisations of random variables. In particular, g is a selection of the network formation game, g is a
realisation of G. g·j is a selection of the section j game, g·j is a realisation of G·j .
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integrable, one can define the conditional Aumann expectation of Qθu(X, ) as
E(Qθu(X, )|X = x; θ) ≡ {E(qg|X = x; θ)|qg ∈ Sel(Qθu(X, ))},
∀x ∈ Xn, where E denotes the “classical” expectation. Hence, E(Qθu(X, )|X = x; θ) is the
collection of the probability distributions of G conditional on X = x predicted by the model
given θ.
We introduce the same objects for the local games. For each j∈N, define
qg·j ≡ (1{·j ∈ Eg·jθu,g·j} ∀g·j ∈ {0, 1}n−1),
of size 2n−1 × 1. Let
Qj,θu(X, ·j) ≡ {qg·j |g·j ∈ Sel(Sj,θu(X, ·j))}.
Qj,θu(X, ·j) can be shown to be a random closed set. As all the selections of Qj,θu(X, ·j) are
integrable, one can define the conditional Aumann expectation of Qj,θu(X, ·j) as
E(Qj,θu(X, ·j)|X = x; θ) ≡ {E(qg·j |X = x; θ)|qg·j ∈ Sel(Qj,θu(X, ·j))},
∀x ∈ Xn. Hence, E(Qj,θu(X, ·j)|X = x; θ) is the collection of the probability distributions of
G·j conditional on X = x predicted by the model given θ.
Therefore, Θ? can be equivalently expressed as
Θ? =
{
θ ∈ Θ|P(G|X = x) ∈ E(Qθu(X, )|X = x; θ) ∀x ∈ Xn a.s.
}
, (C.6)




θ ∈ Θ|P(G·j |X = x) ∈ E(Qj,θu(X, ·j)|X = x; θ) ∀j ∈N, ∀x ∈ Xn a.s.
}
, (C.7)
where P(G·j |X = x) ≡ (P(G·j = g·j |X = x) ∀g·j ∈ {0, 1}n−1).
Step 2.2 Given the selection g ≡ (g·1, ...,g·n) ∈ Sel(Sθu(X, )) and the realisation g ≡
(g·1, ..., g·n) ∈ G, let E(qg|X = x; θ)g denote the component of the vector E(qg|X = x; θ)
corresponding to g. Let E(qg·j |X = x; θ)g·j denote the component of the vector E(qg·j |X =
x; θ) corresponding to g·j . Under Assumption 3 a),
E(qg|X = x; θ)g
(C.5)︷︸︸︷
= E(Πnj=11{·j ∈ Eg·jθu,g·j}|X = x; θ)g
Ass.3 a)︷︸︸︷
= Πnj=1E(qg·j |X = x; θ)g·j ,
∀g ≡ (g·1, ..., g·n) ∈ G, ∀x ∈ Xn, and ∀θ ∈ Θ.
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Step 2.3 Let θ0 ≡ (θ0u, θ0 ) denote the true parameter value. Under Assumption 3,
P(G = g|X = x) ≡
∫
e∈Rn(n−1)









P(G·j = g·j |X = x, ·j = e·j)dFj(e·j ; θ0 )
≡ Πnj=1P(G·j = g·j |X = x),
∀g ≡ (g·1, ..., g·n) ∈ G and ∀x ∈ Xn.
Step 2.4 By (C.7), if θ ∈ Θ??, then ∀j ∈N there exists g·j ∈ Sel(Sj,θu(X, ·j)) such that
P(G·j = g·j |X = x) = E(qg·j |X = x; θ)g·j ,
∀g·j ∈ {0, 1}n−1 and ∀x ∈ Xn a.s. This implies
Πnj=1P(G·j = g·j |X = x) = Πnj=1E(qg·j |X = x; θ)g·j ,
∀g·j ∈ {0, 1}n−1 and ∀x ∈ Xn a.s., which, by steps 2.2 and 2.3, is equivalent to
P(G = g|X = x) = E(qg|X = x; θ)g,
∀g ≡ (g·1, ..., g·n) ∈ G and ∀x ∈ Xn a.s. Hence, by (C.6), θ ∈ Θ?.
D How to construct AG
We start with explaining how to construct AG when n = 3. First, note that
{0, 1}n−1 =
{






{(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)}, {(1, 1), (1, 0)}, {(1, 1), (0, 1)}, {(1, 1), (0, 0)}, {(1, 0), (0, 1)},
{(1, 0), (0, 0)}, {(0, 1), (0, 0)}, {(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1)}, {(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 0)}, {(1, 1), (0, 1), (0, 0)},




AG is obtained by taking the Cartesian product of all the possible ordered n-tuples with repeti-
tions from K{0,1}n−1 . For example, AG contains
{(1, 1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Set of equilibria
of section 1 game
×{(1, 1), (0, 0)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Set of equilibria
of section 2 game
× {(0, 0)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Set of equilibria
of section 3 game
=
{







{0 1 11 0 1
0 0 0
 ,





of network formation game
.
Similarly, AG contains
{(0, 1)}×{(0, 1)}×{(1, 0)} = {
0 0 10 0 1
1 0 0
}.
By repeating such a calculation for all the possible ordered n-tuples with repetitions from
K{0,1}n−1 , one finds that |AG| = (22n−1 − 1)n = 3375.
Conversely, AG does to contain, e.g.,
{0 1 11 0 0
0 0 0
 ,
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 ,
0 1 00 0 1
1 1 0
},
and {0 1 11 0 0
0 0 0
 ,
0 0 01 0 0
0 0 0
 ,
0 1 11 0 0
0 1 0
}.
We now generalise the procedure to any n. Consider n sets, K1 ∈ K{0,1}n−1 , ...,Kn ∈
K{0,1}n−1 . Construct the set BK1,...,Kn ≡×nj=1Kj . Hence, BK1,...,Kn is a collection of L ≡
Πnj=1|Kj | sets and it can be written as {Bl}Ll=1. Any set Bl ∈ BK1,...,Kn is composed by n
vectors of size (n − 1) × 1. Thus, Bl ≡ {bl,1, ..., bl,n} with bl,h ≡ (b1l,h, ..., bn−1l,h ) ∀h ∈ {1, ..., n},






















































∀l ∈ {1, ..., L}. Let A ≡ {C1, ..., CL}. Repeat the procedure for all the possible K1 ∈
K{0,1}n−1 , ...,Kn ∈K{0,1}n−1 and denominate the family of A’s sets as AG.
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